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Abstract
This Comment discusses the effect that international organized crime and foreign government
corruption has upon money laundering and the resultant need for the FMLDA. Part I discusses
the basic elements of money laundering and the criminal actors who launder internationally, and
anlyzes existing U.S. legislation designed to combat laundering and problems in the current leg-
islation. Part II explains the legislative history, purpose, and proposed provisions of the FMLDA.
Part III advocates adoption of this Act, and argues that the United States should no longer be
complicit in the corruption and degradation of foreign governments via U.S. financial institutions.
COMMENT
ATTACKING THE TOOLS OF CORRUPTION: THE
FOREIGN MONEY LAUNDERING DETERRENCE AND
ANTICORRUPTION ACT OF 1999
Julie Fendo*
1NTRODUCTION
On August 19, 1999, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investiga-
don ("FBI") publicly announced its examination of alleged Rus-
sian money laundering' through the Bank of New York. 2 Com-
mentators noted that the Bank of New York scandal was possibly
the largest money laundering operation that criminals had ever
executed in the United States. 3 Approximately US$10 billion
were laundered through Bank of New York accounts,4 as well as
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1. See Duncan E. Afford, Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: A Burden on Financial
Institutions, 19 N.C.J. INT'L LAw & COM. REG. 437, 437 (1994) (defining money launder-
ing as "process by which one conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal application
of income, and then disguises that income to make it appear legitimate."). This defini-
tion is identical to the one proposed by the President's Commission on Organized
Crime. See PRESIDENT'S CoanMUssIoN ON ORGANIZED CiuemE, THE CASH CONNEecnON: OR-
GANIZED CRimE, FrNANcrAL INsTIrTUTONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING 7 (1984) (asserting
that criminals use money laundering as tool to enable enjoyment of illicit profits).
2. See Russian Organized Crime Without Punishment, ECONOMISt, Aug. 28, 1999, at 17
(noting that Bank of New York exposed investigation by affirming that bank had coop-
erated with U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI")).
3. See id. (reporting International Monetary Fund's (or "IMF") belief that criminals
may launder between US$500 billion and US$1.5 trillion annually); see also Robert
O'HarrowJr., Couple Admit Role in Laundering Billions out of Russia, WASH. PosT, Feb. 18,
2000, at 7 (noting that couple executed over 160,000 electronic banking transactions,
worth at least US$7 billion, through Bank of NewYork (or "BONY") and banks in Rus-
sia and other countries).
4. Compare Russian Organized Crime Without Punishment, supra note 2, at 17 (charac-
terizing Russia as "the world's leading kleptocracy") with Raymond Bonner & Timothy
L. O'Brien, Bank Called Long Unaware of Big, Suspicious Transfers, N.Y. TIMFS, Aug. 27,
1999, at A12 (claiming that more than US$4.2 billion was tied to organized crime and
laundered through Bank of New York accounts).
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other foreign and offshore banks.5 Investigators believe that a
large portion of the funds originated from the illegal activities of
Russian organized crime groups and corrupt Russian govern-
ment officials.6
The Bank of New York case represents a global concern for
international organized crime groups and money laundering.
7
These crime syndicates are exploiting an increasingly interna-
tional financial services industry in order to launder the pro-
ceeds from illegal activity.8 Russia is a prime example of a coun-
try marred by organized crime and government corruption.9
Countries such as Russia serve as a bastion for organized crimi-
nal activity' ° and are increasingly utilizing Western financial in-
5. See Russian Organized Crime Without Punishmen4 supra note 2, at 17 (asserting that
"[t]he paper-trail has touched several European banks too, all of which are said to have
helped, over the past year, to move $4 billion from Russia to BONY's London office.");
see also Greg B. Smith, 2 Plead Guilty in Banking Scheme, N.Y. DAILY NEvs, Feb. 16, 2000,
at 12 (noting that hundreds of Russian deposits were made into Bank of New York
accounts between 1996 and July 1999).
6. See Russian Organized Crime Without Punishmen supra note 2, at 18 (detailing
extent of Russian organized crime and stating that Russian Interior Ministry estimated
that organized criminal groups control at least 40% of Russian economy); see also
Sharon LaFraniere & Robert 0' Harrow Jr., No Open-and-Shut Case; Unfolding Bank of
New York Probes Have Multiple Leads, Confusing Plots, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1999, at HO
(providing that FBI, Manhattan District Attorney's Office, Swiss, and British prosecutors
are performing overlapping investigations into alleged Bank of New York money-laun-
dering scandal). But see Timothy L. O'Brien, Bank of New York Ex-Employee Charged in
Russian Case; N.Y. TiMns, Dec. 1, 1999, at A8 (explaining that as of December 1, 1999,
federal prosecutors had not yet filed actual U.S. money laundering charges).
7. See Prepared Testimony Before the House Comm. on International Relations, Oct. 7,
1999, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Hearing File [hereinafter Hearings 1] (testimony
of Prof. Keith Henderson) (commenting on relationship between Bank of New York
scandal and international Russian organized crime). It has been noted that,
"[w]hatever the facts and findings in the Bank of NewYork money laundering case, it is
representative of larger, inter-related global problems: Weak, non-transparent, global
and country financial systems, poor oversight and accountability, strong transnational
criminal networks and official and corporate corruption." Id.
8. Id.
9. See id. (explaining that Russia has long history of defacto rule by organized crime
groups); see also Eugene Solomonov, Comment, U.S.-Russian Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty: Is There a Way To Control Russian Organized Crime, 23 FoRDHAM INrr'L LJ. 165, 170-
71 (1999) (claiming that organized crime has plagued Russia since 17th century).
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russian organized crime expanded
and gained momentum due to the opportunities to exploit the new Russian market-
place. Solomonov, supra, at 171. These modem crime syndicates are "composed pri-
marily of former government officials, secret Soviet marketers, and common criminals."
Id.
10. SeeForeign Money Laundering Deterrence and Anticorruption Act, H.R. 2896,
106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter FMLDA] (finding that countries, such as Colombia,
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stitutions to launder money gained from illicit activity."
Experts have shown that money laundering threatens the
authority of national governments, corrupts government offi-
cials, harms the economic stability of host nations as well as
global markets, and frustrates U.S. foreign policy.12 For these
reasons, the Foreign Money Laundering Deterrence and An-
ticorruption Act of 1999 ("FMLDA7) has been introduced to
Congress. 13 As the name suggests, this bill is designed to prevent
and deter international money laundering by organized
criminals, as well as money laundering by corrupt government
officials.' 4
This Comment discusses the effect that international organ-
ized crime and foreign government corruption has upon money
laundering, and the resultant need for the FMLDA. Part I of this
Comment discusses the basic elements of money laundering and
the criminal actors who launder money internationally. Part I
also analyzes existing U.S. legislation designed to combat money
laundering and the problems in the current legislation due to
the globalization of international organized crime groups and
government corruption. Part II explains the legislative history,
purpose, and proposed provisions of the FMLDA. Part III advo-
cates adoption of this Act. This part argues that the United
Mexico, and Russia have sophisticated organized criminal enterprises, which are diffi-
cult for U.S. law enforcement officials to monitor).
11. See FMLDA, H.R. 2896, 106th Cong., § 2 (1)-(2) (explaining that Foreign
Money Laundering Deterrence and Anticorruption Act ("FMLDA") was drafted specifi-
cally to deal with international money laundering). Section 2(1) states:
Money laundering enables international organized crime groups to control
and legitimize proceeds from a wide variety of illegal activities including theft,
racketeering, terrorism, tax evasion, fraud, insider trading, and traffic in nar-
cotics, arms, and other contraband. In many instances, these activities impact
United States citizens and territory and frustrate United States foreign policy.
Id.
12. See id. § 2 (noting Congressional findings of fact relating to causes and effects
of international money laundering). Section 2(2) states:
Money laundering by international criminal enterprises challenges the legiti-
mate authority of national governments, corrupts officials and professionals,
endangers the financial and economic stability of nations, diminishes the effi-
ciency of global interest rate markets, and routinely violates legal norms, prop-
erty rights, and human rights.
Id.
13. Id.
14. See id. (finding that international organized criminals and corrupt government
officials have been laundering illicit funds through U.S. financial institutions).
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States should no longer be complicit in the corruption and deg-
radation of foreign governments via U.S. financial institutions.
This Comment concludes that the rise of the laundering of
funds derived from international organized crime and corrup-
tion requires the adoption of legislation typified by the FMLDA,
which is designed to deal explicitly with international financial
entities.
I. INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING AND U.S.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Money laundering is the process criminals use to hide the
existence, source, and use of illegal income in a manner that
allows this income to appear legitimate in the open economic
market1 5 International organized crime groups 6 and corrupt
government officials use money laundering to conceal the ori-
gins of money from such illegal activities as fraud, tax evasion,
embezzlement, theft, racketeering, terrorism, insider trading,
and traffic in narcotics, arms, and other contraband. 7 The
money laundering process permits the proceeds of such underly-
ing crimes to appear as though they were legally obtained.'
8
Although current U.S. anti-money laundering statutes prove ef-
fective tools for apprehending criminals who launder money do-
mestically,"9 experts urge the adoption of legislation designed to
15. See Alford, supra note 1, at 437 (asserting that drug traffickers in United States
alone launder US$100 billion per annum). U.S. law enforcement agents concentrate
on deterring and prosecuting money launderers as a means of curtailing the drug
trade. Id. Increasingly more nations are adopting money laundering statutes and col-
laborating with other states to prosecute drug traffickers. I&
16. See U.S. Department of Justice, The Internatimonal Crime Control Strategy, (visited
Oct. 2, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/criininal/press/presltr.htn> [hereinafter Depart-
ment ofJustice] (on file with the Fordham International LawJournal) (Statement of Rob-
ert E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury) (stating that money laundering "is the 'life
blood' of organized crime"). Mr. Rubin, however, further stated that money launder-
ing "is also the 'Achilles heel,' as it gives us a way to attack the leaders of criminal
organizations. While drug kingpins and other bosses of organized crime may be able to
separate themselves from street-level criminal activity, they cannot separate themselves
from the profits of that activity." Id.
17. See FMLDA, H.R. 2896, 106th Cong., § 2(1) (explaining that money launder-
ing allows criminals to make their illegal proceeds appear legitimate).
18. See Alford, supra note 1, at 439 (describing money laundering methods). For
instance, changing smaller bills into larger ones eases the transportation of illegal pro-
ceeds. Id.
19. See Scott Sultzur, Note, Money Laundering. The Scope of the Problem and Attempts To
Combat It, 63 TENN. L. REv. 143, 151 (1995) (noting that U.S. legislation has discour-
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prosecute criminals who launder money internationally. 20
A. Money Laundering Techniques and Practices
Criminals typically employ several techniques to launder
money both domestically and internationally.2' Often these
techniques involve transferring funds from one bank to another
in order to avoid detection.22 As the financial services industry
becomes increasingly globalized,23 international money launder-
ers are using wire and on-line transfers to shift illicit funds from
country to country.2 4 Generally, the further away illegal pro-
ceeds get from U.S. law enforcement agents, the more difficult it
is to prosecute international money launderers under the cur-
rent U.S. anti-money laundering statutory framework.2
1. The Elements and Methods of Money Laundering
Criminals launder money in three stages: the placement
stage, the layering stage, and the integration stage. 26 During the
placement stage, money launderers physically deposit illicit
aged money launderers from depositing illicit funds into mainstream U.S. bank ac-
counts).
20. See, e.g., Department ofJustice, supra note 16 (quoting U.S. Attorney General
Janet Reno as saying "[w]e need new tools to target money launderers, including inter-
national drug merchants").
21. See Alford, supra note 1, at 439 (noting that drug traffickers rely on money
laundering to enjoy their profits); see also Peter E. Meltzer, Keeping Drug Money fion
Reaching the Wash Cycle: A Guide to the Bank Secrecy Ac 108 BANKING LJ. 230, 245-49
(1991) (claiming that criminals often launder money through wire transfers from one
bank to another).
22. Id.
23. See Hearing Before the Senate Gomm on Finance and International Trade, 104th
Cong. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Hearings 11] (arguing that "[w]ith the growth in interna-
tional free trade and ever improving electronic fund transfer technologies, the drug
trade has found new and improved methods of securing the fruits of their ill gotten
gains.").
24. See FMLDA, H.R. 2896, 106th Cong., § 2(7). Section 2(7) states:
Recent advances in communications and information technology, particularly
in the field of online transactions, have meant that offshore financial centers,
originally concentrated near the "onshore" nations whose rules they circum-
vented, are being established in increasingly remote locations that are difficult
and costly for law enforcement and supervisory authorities to monitor and
visit.
Id.
25. Id.
26. See Meltzer, supra note 21, at 231 (describing three phases of money launder-
ing); see also Sultzur, supra note 19, at 148 (commenting that money laundering allows
criminals to avoid having illicit proceeds confiscated and to escape arrest).
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money, gained from the illegal activities, into a financial institu-
tion.2 7 Next, these criminals layer money by transferring it sev-
eral times to different accounts or institutions in order to ob-
scure its original source. 28 Finally, during the integration stage,
money launderers transfer the money into a legitimate business
or use it for some other legal purpose.29 By the time the money
launderers complete this process, it is virtually impossible to
trace the money back to its original illicit source."0
Commentators note that the money laundering process is
most susceptible to detection by law enforcement officials dur-
ing the placement phase because the money is still close enough
to its original source to be traced fairly easily.31 For this reason,
legislators have focused most of their enforcement and prevent-
ative efforts on the placement phase. 2 For instance, the Bank
Secrecy Act33 ("BSA") requires U.S. banks to file currency trans-
action reports 4 ("CTR") whenever US$10,000 or more is with-
drawn from or deposited into one account during a single day.3"
27. See Meltzer, supra note 21, at 231 (noting that money launderers often deposit
illegal funds in several different bank accounts).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Sultzur, supra note 19, at 150 (commenting that layering stage is extremely
difficult for U.S. lav enforcement officials to trace). Often money launderers will layer
money using elaborate schemes such as "counterbalancing loan schemes" to divert law
enforcement officials. Id. Counterbalancing loan schemes entail using the value of
accounts comprised of illegal funds as collateral for a loan in another country. Id.
31. See Lawrence L.C. Lee, Combating Illicit Narcotics Traffic in Taiwan: The Proposed
Money Laundering Control Act; 4 TUL. J. INT'L & CoMP. L 189, 210 (1996) (explaining
investigative methods of tracking down sources of illegal funds); see also Meltzer, supra
note 21, at 232 (describing how law enforcement officials focus on placement stage
because U.S. banks must follow statutory reporting requirements).
32. Meltzer, supra note 21, at 232.
33. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5314,
5316-5325 (1994); see also Daniel Mulligan, Comment, Know Your Customer Regulations
and the International Banking System: Towards a General Seif-Regulatoy Regime, 22 FORDHAm
INT'L LJ. 2324, 2334-35 (1999) (commenting that Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act was referred to as Bank Secrecy Act ("BSA") by financial community).
U.S. Banks often complain that the Bank Secrecy Act places heavy administrative and
financial burdens on their businesses. Mulligan, supra, at 2340.
34. See 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1994) (giving U.S. Secretary of Treasury power to set
reporting limits on currency transaction).
35. Id. §§ 5311-14; see 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1992) (describing currency transaction
reporting ("CIR) requirement form, alternatively referred to as IRS Form 4789). Title
31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a) (1) states:
Each financial institution other than a casino or the Postal Service shall file a
report of each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency or other payment or
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As legislative precautions become more stringent, 6 criminals
simply create more intricate techniques to circumvent the CTR
requirement.3
7
Money launderers use a variety of methods to avoid transac-
tion reporting requirements. 8 For example, money launderers
will sometimes set up front companies.39 Often, money launder-
ers will choose a type of business, like a restaurant, that is ex-
empt from the CTR requirement.' Money launderers combine
proceeds from the illegal activity with the legitimate proceeds,
however minimal, from the front company and deposit the
funds into one bank account.41 The bank is not required to file
a CTR, and it is difficult to trace the origins of the illicit money
even if foul play is suspected.42 Scholars note that because the
government already receives over 600,000 CTRs per month, it is
not administratably feasible to get rid of these exemptions.43
transfer, by, through, or to such financial institution which involves a transac-
tion in currency of more than $10,000. Transactions in currency by exempt
persons with banks are not subject to this requirement to the extent provided
in paragraph (h) of this section. Multiple currency transactions shall be
treated as a single transaction if the financial institution has knowledge that
they are by or on behalf of any person and result in either cash in or cash out
totaling more than $10,000 during any one business day. Deposits made at
night or over a weekend or holiday shall be treated as if received on the next
business day following the deposit.
Id.
36. See, e.g., Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1956-57 (1994);
31 U.S.C. § 5313-5326 (1994)) (criminalizing structuring of transactions in order to
dodge CTR requirement. Structured transactions are multiple transactions made by
one person, or by multiple persons on behalf of the individual account owner, totaling
US$10,000 or more in one day. 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1994).
37. See generally Alford, supra note 1, at 439-40 (describing ways in which money
launderers have taken advantage of technological advances in communications indus-
try).
38. See id. at 440 (explaining, for example, that money launderers often engage in
real estate transactions in order to avoid CTR requirement); see also Sultzer, supra note
19, at 149 (offering jewelry stores and cash checking businesses as other examples of
front companies).
39. See Alford, supra note 1, at 440 (noting, for example, that these front compa-
nies often mix drug sale proceeds with money from legitimate businesses).
40. Id.; see also 31 U.S.C. § 5312 (1994) (listing other exempt businesses, such as
retail stores and coin laundries).
41. See Alford, supra note 1, at 440 (commenting that money launderers often mix
illegitimate proceeds with illicit proceeds in order to hide criminal profits).
42. Id.
43. See id. (stating that exempted businesses are usually retail oriented, and thus
would regularly require filing of CTR).
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2. Using U.S. Financial Institutions as Tools of
Money Laundering
Money launderers often use wire transfers from one bank to
another in order to mask the origin of their money.' Commen-
tators note that it is difficult for law enforcement officials to dis-
tinguish illegitimate from legitimate wire transfers, especially
when wired internationally into U.S. banks.45 Some money laun-
derers set up small boutique banks in which they deposit illegal
money.46 These boutique banks then deal with larger corre-
spondent banks, which wire the money through several different
accounts. 47
Some money launderers choose to transfer funds into cur-
rency-exchange businesses and other non-bank financial institu-
tions.48 These institutions generally contain more relaxed regu-
latory and reporting requirements than banks.49 This method is
another way for money launderers to prevent the filing of a
CTR.50
An increasingly popular method for international criminals
and organized crime groups to layer money through U.S. banks
is by utilizing payable through accounts ("PTA").51 A PTA is an
account that an international banking institution opens at a U.S.
44. See BuaARA WEBS=ER & MICHAEL S. MCCAMPBELL, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, INTER-
NATMONAL MONEY LAUNDERING: RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATIONJOIN FORCES 5 (1992) (set-
ting out description of difficulties encountered by law enforcement officials when inves-
tigating wire transfers).
45. Id. at 5; see Nicholas Clark, 77w Impact of Recent Money Laundering Legislation on
Financial Intermediaries, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 467, 469-70 (1996) (commenting that "web
of transaction" is difficult for U.S. law enforcement officials to follow).
46. See Alford, supra note 1, at 440 (explaining that these boutique banks do busi-
ness with correspondent banks and wire money through different accounts in order to
hide original illicit source of money).
47. Id.
48. See Mulligan, supra note 33, at 2333-34 (asserting that in March 1995, Federal
Deposit Insurance Company ("FDIC") created guidelines for U.S. banks to consider
when issuing payable-through accounts (or "PTA") to international clients).
49. See Kirk W. Munroe, Suruiving the Solution, The Extraterritorial Reach of the United
States, 14 DicKJ. INT'L L. 505, 506 (1996) (commenting that these non-bank financial
institutions have lax reporting requirements, making them ideal shelters for illicit
funds).
50. Id.
51. See Mulligan, supra note 33, at 2333 (noting that PTAs became popular with
international banks as U.S. banking regulations became stricter, approving less interna-
tional banks for operation in United States).
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depository institution.52 The international banking institution
allows its customers to perform the normal banking activities
that U.S. customers are able to perform with U.S. bank ac-
counts.5 3 Thus, international money launderers, acting as direct
customers of a U.S. bank, can launder money by wire transfers
and checks that are issued at their own bank, yet payable
through the U.S. bank.54 By conducting financial transactions at
their own national bank first, international money launderers
evade U.S. Know Your Customer ("KYC") policies designed to
prevent money laundering.5 The U.S. financial institution that
houses the PTA has no independent way of knowing the identity
of their PTA customers.56
Law enforcement officials are also deeply concerned about
the use of offshore banking institutions57 to launder money.
58
52. See FMLDA, H.R. 2896, 106th Cong., § 5(d) (B) (7) (defining PTA). This sec-
tion states:
The term 'payable-through account' means an account, including a transac-
tion account (as defined in section 19(b) (1) (C) of the Federal Reserve Act),
opened at a depository institution by a foreign banking institution by means of
which the foreign banking institution permits its customers to engage, either
directly or through a sub-account, in banking activities usual in connection
with the business of banking in the United States.
Id.
53. See id. (noting that international banks enable their customers to "engage,
either directly or through a sub-account, in banking activities usual in connection with
the business of banking in the United States").
54. SeeMulligan, supra note 33, at 2333 (describing benefits PTAs offer for interna-
tional money launderers).
55. See Guidelines for Monitoring Bank Secrecy Act Compliance, available in 1996 WL
271924, at *9 (explaining that Know Your Customer ("KYC") policies require U.S.
banks to keep reports maintaining specified information on each customer). The FDIC
encourages banks to use "reasonable efforts" to discover the true identity of each cus-
tomer and to ascertain the stated business purpose of each commercial customer. Id.
The FDIC issued its own guidelines to ensure that banks comply with Section 326.8 of
the FDIC's Rules and Regulations, which mandates inter-bank procedures designed to
ensure compliance with U.S. Department of Treasury rules. Id. at *1. See also Mulligan,
supra note 33, at 2326 (noting that KYC policies are partially codified in BSA).
56. See Warning, Guidelines Issued To Protect Against Improper or Illegal Use of "Payable
Through" Accounts, Apr. 7, 1995, available in 1995 WL 480501 (setting out list of PTA
guidelines). These guidelines recommend, for instance, that U.S. banks terminate pay-
able-through arrangements with international banks when they cannot obtain adequate
information about the actual users of such PTAs. Id.
57. See FMLDA, H.. 2896, 106th Cong., § 2(6) (defining offshore financial cen-
ters as "nations, regions, zones, and cities that in many instances have virtually impene-
trable financial secrecy laws and weak financial regulatory and reporting regimes, which
are tailored to violate or circumvent the laws of other nations").
58. See Douglas Farah, Caribbean Cash Havens Arouse U.S. Suspicions; Critics Say Island
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Offshore financial centers are foreign nations or zones that pri-
oritize the ability of their customers to bank in secrecy and spe-
cifically design their financial institutions to evade the banking
laws of other nations.59 As a result, U.S. law enforcement offi-
cials have encountered difficulties monitoring these jurisdic-
tions.6" Even when the FBI or other U.S. law enforcement agen-
cies find evidence of money laundering transactions, it is diffi-
cult for them to obtain corroborating information from offshore
jurisdictions because of stringent secrecy laws. 6'
Offshore banking jurisdictions often offer the customer
complete financial privacy by mandating criminal penalties for
disclosing the customer's identity and other financial informa-
tion.62 These secrecy laws even prohibit banks from releasing
information to law enforcement authorities without the cus-
tomer's permission.63 Money launderers attempting to hide the
connection between their names and their bank accounts can
open accounts in virtual anonominity.64 The customer interacts
Banks Shelter Criminal Funds, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1999, at Al (noting that recent IMF
study estimated that amount of money in offshore havens totaled US$4.8 trillion in
1997); see alsoJoshua Warmund, Comment, Removing Drug Lords and Street Pushers: The
Extradition of Nationals in Colombia and the Dominican Republic, 22 FoRDHAm INT'L LJ.
2373, 2413 (1999) (revealing that criminals launder over US$1 billion from United
States through financial institutions in Dominican Republic every year).
59. See FMLDA, H.R. 2896, 106th Cong., § 2(6) (noting that as older, traditional
offshore havens have begun to conform to internationally acceptable banking stan-
dards, new havens are quickly taking their place).
60. Id.; see also Alford, supra note 1, at 441 (noting that offshore financial institu-
tions with strict bank secrecy laws in 1994 included Austria, Hong Kong, and Luxem-
bourg). But see Farah, supra note 58, at Al (stating that majority of offshore banking
havens have been recently established in Caribbean islands). As more traditional off-
shore bankingjurisdictions have succumbed to international pressures to regulate their
banks and weaken their secrecy laws, many offshore banking havens have been estab-
lished in increasingly remote places, such as the Caribbean islands. Farah, supra. These
Caribbean offshore centers include Anguilla, Antigua, Barbados, Barbuda, the British
Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, the Grenadines, Montserrat,
the Netherlands Antilles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, the Turks and Caicos Islands,
and St. Vincent. Id.; see also Warmund, supra note 58, at 2413 (asserting that Dominican
banks encourage money launderers by implementing relaxed banking procedures).
Dominican banks also established branches in distant locations, such as Thailand.
Warmund, supra.
61. See GLOBAL MONEY LAUNDERING RuLEs SEEN NEEDED To REDUCE DRUG PROFIT
FLows, Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 56, at 582 (Mar. 25, 1991) (asserting that secrecy laws
often forbid banks from releasing information about customer accounts).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Alford, supra note 1, at 443 (showing other ways depositors can keep their
identities secret within offishorejurisdictions). Trusts may also be set up where only the
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only with the account manager, who utilizes the account
number, rather than the customer's name, during all transac-
tions.65
B. Agents of Money Laundering
International crime groups increasingly are disregarding na-
tional borders and creating multi-national crime syndicates.66
Members of international organized crime groups and corrupt
government officials launder the proceeds from illegal activities
and money embezzled from domestic governments through U.S.
banks and other financial institutions.67 The recent Bank of
New York case illustrates the ways in which organized crime, gov-
ernment corruption, and money laundering have combined to
become what experts consider a global nightmare.'
1. Organized Crime
U.S. legislators believe that international organized crime
groups have exploited the effects of globalization in the commu-
nication and transportation industries in order to expand the
scope of their illegal activities.69 These criminals now threaten
both national and international security.70 In some countries,
like Colombia, Mexico, 71 and Russia, organized crime groups
bank knows the identity of the trustee. Id. Corporations issuing bearer shares, which
are sold without reference to identity, can be created. Id. An attorney creating the
corporation would be the only person to know the name of the original owner. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Department ofJustice, supra note 16 (noting that globalization of organized
crime requires multi-layered law enforcement approach).
67. Id.
68. See Hearings I, supra note 7 (testimony of Prof. Keith Henderson) (urging inter-
national cooperation by law enforcement officials). The Bank of New York case illus-
trates the need for international law enforcement officials to concentrate on the finan-
cial sector and corporate governance. Id.; see also Jeff Leeds, Indictment Issued in N.Y.
Bank Probe; Finance: Former Bank Exec, Two Businessmen Targeted in Russia Money-Launder-
ing Case. More Charges Likely, L.A. TiMEs, Oct. 6, 1999, at Al (commenting that Russia's
government and economy is subsumed in organized crime and corruption).
69. See Russian Corruption and Money Laundering 1999: Congressional Testimony by
Federal Document Clearing House (last visited May 15, 2000) <http://www.house.gov/
banking/92299.rob.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinaf-
ter Hearings 1111 (testimony ofJames K. Robinson) (focusing on Russia while explaining
immediate importance of combating money laundering).
70. Id.
71. See generally, H.R 4005-Money Laundering Deterrence Act of 1998 And H.R.
1756-Money Laundering And Financial Crimes Strategy Act of 1997: Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Banking & Financial Services, 105th Cong. 10 (1998) (testimony of Rep-
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hold as much wealth and power as the governments them-
selves. 72 These criminal groups often use their power to influ-
ence and corrupt domestic government officials. 75
International organized crime syndicates conduct a variety
of illegal activities in the United States and then launder the pro-
ceeds through domestic and international financial institu-
tions.74 For example, international traffickers smuggle drugs
like heroin and cocaine into the country.7' Some members of
international crime groups concentrate on fraud, deceiving the
U.S. public, especially the elderly, into investing in illegitimate
moneymaking schemes.76 Others create fake charitable organi-
zations and embezzle the funds. 7 Still others penetrate U.S.
resentative Spencer Bachus). Representative Bachus stated, "It['s] simply not realistic
to expect Mexico to clean up its financial institutions in the near term, even if one
assumes that Mexico is somehow able to reverse its legendary corruption problem."
"The bottom line, Mexico is a money-laundering black hole, and remains so for the
foreseeable future." Id.
72. See FMLDA, H.R. 2896, 106th Cong., § 2(3) (finding criminals in these coun-
tries rival their national governments for power).
73. See, e.g., Hearings 1, supra note 69 (testimony of James K. Robinson) (listing
Russian corruption as example of government infiltrated by organized crime and grand
corruption); see also Stanislaw Pomorski, Reflections on the First Criminal Code of Post-Com-
munist Russia, 46 Am.J. Comp. L. 375, 376 n.6 (1998) (listing other countries with high
levels of government corruption, such as Bolivia, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Mexico,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Venezuela, and Vietnam).
74. See Sultzer, supra note 19, at 147 (noting that new class of criminals has
emerged due to money laundering). The majority of people who launder money for
organized crime syndicates are professionals, such as lawyers, bankers, and accountants,
who have expertise in business. Id. These individuals are often separate from those
who commit the underlying crimes that produce the illegal funds. Id
75. See generay Sharon A. Gardner, Comment, A Global Initiative To DeterDrug Traf-
ficking: Will Internationalizing the Drug War Wo*?, 7 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 287 (1993)
(noting ways in which drug trafficking has become international problem).
76. See Department of Justice, supra note 16 (commenting that as nations come
closer together through use of revolutions in technology and communications,
criminals use same technological revolutions to exploit people internationally); see, e.g.,
Shirish Date, Dropout Bilks Millions from Entrepreneurs; 'Bull Cator' Pulls Off Huge Money-
Laundeing Scam, PAM BAcH PosT, FL, May 8, 1998, at IA (describing Operation Risky
Business, one of largest non-drug-related money laundering scams). Four people in
Gainesville, Florida were indicted in 1997 for masterminding a fraudulent investment
scam. Date, supra. The culprits offered venture capital loans to entrepreneurs in ex-
change for "processing fees" of between US$40,000 to US$2,000,000. Id Investors
never received their loans, and the scammers laundered the fees through wire transfers
and Federal Express to the Caribbean American Bank in Antigua. Id. at A2. In total,
the money launderers swindled at least US$60,000,000 out of investors before they were
apprehended. I&
77. See Department ofJustice, supra note 16 (asserting international criminals also
"steal and modify luxury cars for resale in other countries").
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companies and steal business secrets in order to sell them
abroad.78 International criminal organizations then launder the
money gained through these fraudulent schemes in order to dis-
guise the source of their profits.7 9
2. Government Officials
Government officials of various countries often embezzle
money from their administrations and launder the funds inter-
nationally.8 0 When government officials are linked with organ-
ized crime, corruption thwarts legitimate government efforts to-
wards social justice.81 Corruption hinders governmental efforts
to provide better living standards and economic growth.8 2 For
instance, Russian organized crime groups infiltrate the Russian
government and corrupt officials and judges,13  preventing
meaningful steps towards democracy, as well as the formation of
a strong capitalist market.8 4 Similar situations occur in other de-
veloping countries with high organized crime rates."5
Although such government corruption hurts all nations
through its effects on the global economy, it has a disproportion-
ate impact upon developing countries."6 Money laundering by
78. See id. (noting that international criminals "move vast sums of money through
international financial system--dwarfing the combined economies of many nations.").
79. See id. atVI(A) (listing other international financial crimes, such as counterfeit-
ing, international securities fraud, and credit card fraud).
80. See Hearings 1, supra note 69 (testimony of James K. Robinson) (claiming, for
example, that "Russian organized crime groups provide corrupt businessmen and gov-
ernment officials with protection, muscle, assassination teams and lines of communica-
tion to other groups of criminals, government officials and businessmen).
81. See Department of Justice, supra note 16 ("In some nations in crisis, in transi-
tion from authoritarian to democratic rule, or in the midst of a substantial privatization
process, criminals are able to thrive to such degree that they pose a threat to the rule of
law and the survivability of democracy.").
82. See Hearings I, supra note 7 (testimony of Prof. Keith Henderson) (arguing that
international officials treat corruption like global AIDs epidemic-with silence and
mere rhetoric).
83. See id. (explaining that many corrupt Russian government officials bribe
judges, making Russian legal system useless).
84. See id. (commenting that Russia still has weak civil society that cannot impede
government action).
85. See id. (labeling public and private "grand" corruption as one of largest threats
to economic growth and political stability).
86. See id. (noting that "many development specialists of all disciplines... now
believe that systemic corruption in developing and/or transition countries, such as Rus-
sia, makes long-term sustainable economic and political development virtually un-
achievable.").
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corrupt government officials weakens the financial institutions
and economies of developing countries by hiding illicit funds
from law enforcement officials and helping to evade national tax
laws."7 Often, embezzlement of government funds combined
with powerful organized crime groups prevent the formation of
a viable middle class.88 Presumably, the wealthy include only the
corrupt government elite and members of crime syndicates.8 9
This upper class exploits the poor and makes upward social mo-
bility virtually impossible.90 Furthermore, the U.S. Congress has
found that corrupt government officials routinely violate legal
norms, property rights, and human rights.91
Additionally, according to some commentators, when U.S.
banks allow elite and corrupt government officials in underde-
veloped countries to hide their wealth, these banks undercut ef-
forts by Western governments and entities to help these coun-
tries. 9 2  One example is the International Monetary Fund
("IMF"), which regularly lends money, derived in part from U.S.
taxpayers, to developing countries." More than US$100 billion
is laundered out of poorer countries every year.94 The result is
that U.S. taxpayers, as well as citizens of other IMF member
countries, are donating their money to other nations, and U.S.
banks are financially benefiting from allowing this money to be
embezzled from underdeveloped countries and laundered
87. See Hearings Li, supra note 69 (testimony of James K. Robinson) (noting that
money laundering often enables international criminals to evade paying income tax in
other countries).
88. See Hearings I, supra note 7 (testimony of Prof. Keith Henderson) (noting that
public trust in democratic free markets has been shaken in Russia).
89. See id. (noting need in Russia for democratic pluralism, system of checks and
balances, and independent media and judiciary).
90. Id.
91. See FMLDA, H.R 2896, 106th Cong., § 2 (finding that money laundering is
detrimental to nations with corrupt governments).
92. SeeJeff Gerth, Hearings Offer View into Private Banking; Secret Accounts Under Scru-
tiny as Foreign Wealth Moves Abroad, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 8, 1999, at A6 (interviewing Mr.
Raymond Baker, guest scholar at Brookings Institution).
93. Id.; see also Russian Organized Crime Without Punishment, supra note 2, at 17 (not-
ing that United States pressured IMF to lend Russia more money than originally in-
tended, hoping that Russia would form workable democracy and exploitable market).
Yet, since the Bank of New York scandal, the IMF is concerned that some of its funds
were embezzled and laundered through the Bank of New York. Id. The IMF has since
refused to supply Russia with promised funds on their scheduled deadline. Id.
94. See Gerth, supra note 92, at A6 (commenting that Western banks often serve to
aid criminals in moving money out of other nations).
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through U.S. accounts.95
3. The Bank of New York Case
The Bank of New York case serves as an example of how
international money launderers use U.S. banks as repositories
for illicit funds.96 On February 14, 2000, Lucy Edwards97 and
Peter Berlin,9" the married Russian couple who served as an
early target for the investigation,9 9 pleaded guilty to federal
money laundering charges for laundering funds through the
Bank of New York.10 The couple laundered approximately
95. Id.
96. See Hearings I, supra note 7 (testimony of Prof. Keith Henderson) (noting that
Bank of New York case highlights global anti-money laundering law enforcement
problems as well as rising problem of government corruption).
97. See Leeds, supra note 68, at Al (asserting that Ms. Lucy Edwards was London-
based Vice President at Bank of NewYork who supervised Eastern European accounts);
see also Russian Organized Crime Without Punishment, supra note 2, at 17 (stating that Ms.
Edwards was Russian-born Bank of New York executive and was originally named Ly-
udmila Pritzker). Ms. Edwards was suspended from the bank along with another Rus-
sian executive, Natasha Kagalovsky. Russian Organized Crime Without Punishment, supa.
Mrs. Kagalovsky is married to Konstantin Kagalovsky, who was Russia's IMF representa-
tive in the early 1990s. Id.
98. See Leeds, supra note 68, at Al (asserting that Mr. Peter Berlin opened two
separate accounts at Bank of New York, through which funds were laundered). The
accounts were in the names of Mr. Berlin's companies, Benex and Becs International.
Id. Federal law enforcement officers are investigating possible ties between Benex In-
ternational Co. and YBM Magnex Inc., a Philadelphia based firm that pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to commit securities fraud. Id. U.S. officials believe that YBM Magnex Inc.
is partially owned by Semyon Mogilevitch, a notorious Russian mobster. Id.; see also
Smith, supra note 5, at 12 (noting that Mr. Berlin's companies were based in office suite
in Forest Hills, Queens, New York).
99. See Russian Organized Crime Without Punishment, supra note 2, at 17 (stating that
U.S. law enforcement officials were also originally investigating Bruce Rappaport). Mr.
Rappaport is a Swiss banker serving as the ambassador to Moscow for Antigua, a famous
Caribbean tax haven. Id.
100. See Raymond Bonner & Timothy L. O'Brien, Guilty Pleas Seen in the Laundering
of Russian Money, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 15, 2000, at Al (asserting that Ms. Edwards and Mr.
Berlin agreed to plea- guilty to numerous U.S. criminal charges, including conspiracy to
commit money laundering, visa fraud, wire fraud, and bribery of bank official); see also
Smith, supra note 5, at 12 (stating that Ms. Edwards and Mr. Berlin flew to New York
from London, where they were living since they were indicted in October 1999). The
couple were taken into custody by the FBI and appeared before Manhattan Federal
Judge Shirley Wohl Kram. Smith, supra.; see also Liz Moyer, Couple Plead Guilty in $7B
Laundering Case at Bank of NY, AM. BANKER, Feb. 17, 2000, at 18 (noting that couple
entered pleas in U.S. District Court in Manhattan). The two could face up to 10 years
in prison. Moyer, supra. They are expected, however, to bargain with the U.S. Attor-
ney, exchanging testimony implicating other Bank of New York employees for a possi-
ble place in the federal witness protection program. Id.
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US$7 billion between 1996 and 1999 through Bank of New York
accounts. x01 The majority of the funds originated in Russia and
passed through Bank of New York accounts to third parties
around the world.'0 2 Although officials have established that a
large portion of the funds were laundered in order to evade Rus-
sian tax laws,10 3 commentators believe that some of the money
derived from illegal activities, possibly of Russian organized
crime groups. 10 4
The U.S. investigation, of the Bank of New York, headed by
the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office, began in the fall of
1998.105 Lucy Edwards and Peter Berlin were indicted on Sep-
tember 16, 1999.106 According to the indictment, the couple
orchestrated hundreds of daily wire transfers in and out of two
101. See Moyer, supra note 100, at 18 (commenting that during this time, Ms. Ed-
wards and Ms. Berlin transferred funds from two Russian banks, Depozitarno-Kliringovy
Bank and Commercial Bank Flamingo, through Bank of New York and other interna-
tional banks.
102. See Smith, supra note 5, at 12 (claiming that once illicit funds were transferred
into Bank of New York accounts, money was internationally wired to accounts within
days or sometimes hours).
103. See Moyer, supra note 100, at 18 (explaining that MaryJo White, U.S. Attorney
for the Southern District of New York, stated that laundering scheme was designed
primarily to facilitate Russian tax evasion). Ms. White also asserted that the money
laundering network was used to carry on other types of criminal activities. Id.; see also
Hearings 1, supra note 69 (testimony of James K. Robinson) (noting that Russian or-
ganized crime groups may help Russian businessmen to evade national tax laws by laun-
dering their assets out of Russia). Evading Russian law enforcement and tax officials
serves to weaken the authority of and respect for the law in Russia as well as to corrupt
financial institutions and markets. Hearings 12, supra (testimony ofJames L Robinson).
104. See Moyer, supra note 100, at 18 (reporting that funds involved in Bank of
NewYork scandal included US$300,000 ransom payment to kidnappers of Russian busi-
nessman); see also Smith, supra note 5, at 12 (relating that U.S. investigators are still
inquiring as to whether portion of money derived from Russian organized crime);
Timothy L. O'Brien & Raymond Bonner, Senior Bank Official Took Bribe, US. Says, N.Y.
Tirars, Feb. 16, 2000, at A8 (explaining that Ms. Edwards and Mr. Berlin are not being
charged with laundering criminal proceeds for third parties). Federal law enforcement
officials, however, believe that at least some of the laundered money derived from ille-
gal activities. O'Brien & Bonner, supra.; Timothy O'Brien, Regulators Take Action Against
Bank of New York, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 9, 2000, at C2 (noting that investigators are inquiring
whether some of funds came from corporate theft, political graft, or racketeering).
105. See Bonner & O'Brien, supra note 100, at Al (noting that U.K. and U.S. offi-
cials found that billions of U.S. dollars were transferred through several accounts at
Bank of New York).
106. See Leeds, supra note 68, at Al (noting that Russian businessman, Aleksey
Volkov, was also indicted for conspiracy to transmit and receive illegal funds); see also
O'Brien & Bonner, supra note 100, at Al (noting that couple was indicted for series of
charges, including transferring money without license, but falling short of formal U.S.
money laundering charges). Approximately US$8 million was seized from Edward's
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accounts at the Bank of New York.' °7 The accounts were regis-
tered under the names of Berlin's companies, Benex and Becs
International.10 8
Although the exact nature of Edward's and Berlin's money
laundering pleas have not been revealed, commentators suspect
that the U.S. Attorney's Office will attempt to implicate higher
ranking officials in the money laundering scheme. 0 9 The Bank
of New York may also be exposed to money laundering
charges." 0 Since the Bank of New York case came to light, a
variety of related suits have been filed concerning the scandal."'
and Berlin's accounts when they were indicted. Bonner & O'Brien, supra As part of
their plea negotiations, Edwards and Berlin agreed to forfeit the seized assets. Id.
107. See Leeds, supra note 68, at Al (commenting that Torfinex Co., operated by
Aleskey Volkov, was responsible for executing transfers as ordered from individuals in
Russia).
108. See id. (explaining that Berlin and Edwards were signatories on Becs Interna-
tional's account). Volkov, also indicted, was a co-signer with Berlin on the Benex ac-
count. Id. Given the degree of organized crime and government corruption associated
with Russia, investigators question how the Bank of New York could have overlooked
the suspicious transactions. Id.
109. See Bonner & O'Brien, supra note 100, at Al (asserting that in January 2000,
U.S. prosecutors indicted Svetlana Kudryavtsev on charges of making false statements to
investigators during Bank of New York inquiry). Ms. Kudryavtsev allegedly lied to inves-
tigators when she claimed that she had no knowledge of the couple's business activities
and that she never received money from them. Id. According to the indictment,
Kudryavtsev actually received approximately US$30,000 from Edwards and Berlin. Id.
110. See id. (commenting that "[lawyers with expertise in banking law said that
whenever a senior bank officer admits to such charges, questions arise about the bank's
own culpability."). The Federal Reserve and New York State Banking Department for-
mally sanctioned the Bank of New York for deficiencies in its supervision of overseas
accounts. Id.; see also O'Brien & Bonner, supra note 104, at A8 (noting that couple may
establish that Berlin's accounts remained open because some bank employees pur-
posely chose to ignore suspicious activity).
111. See, e.g., Some Shareholders Sue Bank of New York, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1999, at
C4 (detailing shareholder's lawsuit that was filed against Bank of New York and its di-
rectors). The shareholder derivative suit was filed in the U.S. Southern District of New
York in Manhattan and accused the Bank of New York of reckless mismanagement. Id.
The shareholders believe that the company allowed Russian organized criminals to
launder billions of U.S. dollars through the bank. Id. The suit was filed as a class ac-
tion, but the designation is subject to approval by a federal judge. Id; see also Bank of
New York Official Sues Bank, UNrrD PRESS INT'L (Moscow), Feb. 29, 2000 (reporting that
Natalia Gurfinkel Kagalovsky, who was forced to resign from position of vice president
of Bank of New York, is suing bank in Russian court). Kagalovsky is seeking US$270
million in damages for harming her business reputation by suspending her and linking
her to the money laundering scandal. Bank of New York Official Sues Bank, supra. She is
also considering filing suits in U.K. and U.S. courts. Id.
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C. U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Legislative Responses
The United States combats money laundering through
three primary statutory weapons: Sections 1956 and 1957 of Ti-
tie 18 of the U.S. Code," 2 the Bank Secrecy Act,"' and Section
5324 of Title 31 of the U.S. Code." 4 These acts primarily attack
money that is laundered domestically" 15 or by international drug
traffickers." 6  Recently, however, as international organized
crime groups have expanded their scope," 7 proceeds from
other illegal activities, such as fraud, embezzlement, and tax eva-
sion, have been laundered through U.S. financial institutions."'
Furthermore, globalization of the financial services industry has
made money laundering more difficult for law enforcement of-
ficers to investigate and detect." 9 Consequently, many experts
believe that the U.S. anti-money laundering legislative scheme is
inadequate to deal with the increase in funds laundered from
international organized criminals or corrupt government offi-
cials.' 20 Legislators responded to these concerns by drafting the
112. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (1994) (rendering act of money laundering criminal
offense).
113. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-14, 5316-25 (1994); see Mulligan, supra note 33, at 2334-35
(explaining that BSA was originally entitled Currency and Foreign Transactions Report-
ing Act and has been labeled BSA by banking community).
114. See Money Laundering Control Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1986) (mandating
criminal penalties for structuring of transactions in order to avoid CGR requirement).
115. See Hearings I, supra note 69 (testimony of James L Robinson) (explaining
that many international crimes do not fall under current U.S. anti-money laundering
legislation).
116. See Mulligan, supra note 33, at 2328 (referring to U.S. legislators who placed
heavy emphasis upon fighting war against drugs via anti-money laundering statutes).
117. See Hearings 1, supra note 69 (testimony ofJames L Robinson) (listing many
crimes from which international money launderers derive their funds).
118. See FMLDA, H.R. 2896, 106th Cong., § 2 (finding that other international
organized crime activities include racketeering and insider trading); see also Hearings I,
supra note 69 (testimony of James K Robinson) (commenting that Russian organized
crime groups traditionally operated locally but are now expanding internationally).
119. FMLDA, H.R. 2896, 106th Cong., § 2(4). Section 2(4) states:
Organized criminal enterprises, such as the Colombian and Mexican cartels,
the Russian 'mayfiya', Sicilian crime families, and Chinese gangs, are highly
resistant to conventional law enforcement techniques, and the financial man-
agement and organizational infrastructure of such enterprises are highly so-
phisticated and difficult to track because of the globalization of the financial
services industry.
Id.
120. See Hearings 11, supra note 69 (testimony ofJames K. Robinson) (arguing that
current statutes are powerful tools for combating money laundering taking place within
United States but are not as effective internationally).
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Money Laundering Act of 1998.121 This act, however, was never
ratified.122
1. Current U.S. Statutes
The existing U.S. statutes used to combat money laundering
include 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57, the BSA, and the Money Launder-
ing Control Act of 1986.123 These statutes primarily allow U.S.
prosecutors to prosecute criminals who launder money domesti-
cally 24 and to enlist the help of U.S. banks to alert law enforce-
ment agents about suspicious transactions.12 1 Scholars argue,
however, that the current U.S. statutory framework is not broad
enough to allow for the prosecution of international money
launderers. 2 6
a. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57, Crimes and Criminal Procedure:
Laundering of Monetary Instruments
Money launderers in the United States are prosecuted pri-
marily under sections 1956 and 1957 of the U.S. Code.' 27 In or-
der to prove the crime of money laundering, the government
121. SeeJustice Department Submits Legislation to Combat International Money
Laundering, Press Release for the Department of Justice, Mar. 3, 1998 [hereinafter
Press Release] (noting that Money Laundering Act of 1988 was part of overall effort by
U.S. Department ofJustice to attack international money laundering).
122. See 1998 BiLL TRACKING H.R. 3745, 105th Cong., last visited Nov. 19, 1999
(stating that Money Laundering Act of 1998 is still in committee).
123. See Hearings Il, supra note 69 (testimony of James K. Robinson) (noting that
U.S. Department of Justice has prosecuted over 2000 defendants per year under ex-
isting anti-money laundering statutes). One half of these prosecutions involved pro-
ceeds from drug trafficking. Id. The other half involved proceeds from white collar
crimes, such as health care fraud, and organized crime, such as prostitution, gambling,
extortion, and interstate transportation of stolen property. Id.
124. See id. (maintaining that International Crime Control Strategy was initiated
partially in response to problems prosecuting international money launderers).
125. Id.
126. See Department of Justice, supra note 16, at VI(B) (1) (arguing that United
States needs comprehensive plan to fight money laundering, including improved
prosecutorial tools); see also Hearings I, supra note 69 (testimony of'James K. Robinson)
(noting importance of adding numerous international crimes to list of permissible
Specified Unlawful Activities ("SUAs")).
127. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (1994). Section 1956(a) (1), for example, states:
(a) (1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or
attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves
the proceeds of specified unlawful activity-
(A) (i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlaw-
ful activity; or
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must show that laundered money originated from one of the
crimes, or Specified Unlawful Activities ("SUAs"), enumerated in
18 U.S.C. § 1956.128 Therefore, U.S. prosecutors must prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt both that an underlying SUA occurred
and that the perpetrators of the SUA laundered the illicit pro-
ceeds. 129 U.S. prosecutors encounter problems when either the
illegal proceeds arise from a crime not listed as one of the SUAs,
or when they cannot prove that the suspect committed the un-
derlying SUA28 0
The list of SUAs includes only a limited number of offenses
that occur outside of the United States.'' These offenses are
fraud against a foreign bank, 3 2 kidnapping, 13 narcotics traffick-
ing,13 4 robbery,' extortion, 3 6 destruction of property by means
of explosives, and murder. 3 7 International organized criminal
enterprises, however, launder money from a variety of illegal ac-
tivities, such as fraud, which 18 U.S.C. § 1956 does not list as a
(ii) with intent to engage in conduct constitution a violation of sec-
tion 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part-
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity;, or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or
Federal law, shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than
$500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the
transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not
more than twenty years, or both.
Id.
128. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c) (7) (1994) (listing SUAs); see also Hearings H, supra
note 69 (testimony ofJames Y. Robinson) (explaining difficulties faced by U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice in prosecuting money laundering offenses).
129. See Hearings M1, supra note 69 (testimony ofJames L Robinson) (noting that
when U.S. Department of Justice is precluded from bringing money laundering
charges, it brings other federal charges, such as interstate transportation of stolen prop-
erty).
130. See id. (urging U.S. Congress to adopt additional anti-money laundering legis-
lation).
131. Id.
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(B)(iii) (1994).
133. Id. § 1956(c) (7) (B) (ii).
134. Id. § 1956(c) (7) (B) (i). Section 1956(c) (7) (B) (i) lists: "the manufacture, im-
portation, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance (as such term is defined for the
purposes of the Controlled Substances Act)." Id.
135. d. § 1956(c) (7) (B) (ii).
136. Id.
137. See Hearings I, supra note 69 (testimony ofJames K. Robinson) (commenting
that limited number of foreign offenses qualify as SUA).
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SUA. 3 8 Therefore, these criminals cannot be prosecuted under
the federal money laundering statutes.'3 9 Likewise, a corrupt
governmental official of another country cannot be prosecuted
for embezzling funds from his own government and laundering
them through U.S. financial institutions. 140
Furthermore, U.S. law enforcement agents often encounter
problems obtaining evidence that laundered money was derived
from a foreign SUA because they must often rely on cooperation
from law enforcement officials of other countries.' 4' Some com-
mentators argue that the most corrupt countries, such as Colom-
bia, Mexico, and Russia, from which a majority of international
money laundering offenses originate, are the least coopera-
tive.' 42 Similarly, U.S. law enforcement officials are often de-
138. Id,
139. I&
140. Id.; see also Gerth, supra note 92, at A6 (noting that United States may be
unable to prosecute President Omar Bongo of Gabon for allegedly laundering money
derived from government corruption through Citibank accounts). The U.S. Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations is examining President Bongo's Citibank
account, in which over US$50 million was deposited and derived from unidentified
sources. Gerth, supra Officials believe that much of the money was embezzled from
the Gabon government. Id, The Subcommittee's investigation is part of a larger effort
to scrutinize the connection between private banking and money laundering. Id.
141. See Hearings 1U, supra note 69 (testimony ofJames L Robinson) (listing three
ways to acquire legal assistance from foreign nations: mutual legal assistance treaties
("MLATs"), executive agreements, and formal requests pursuant to letters rogatory).
The most effective means of obtaining information from foreign countries is through
an MLAT. Id. MLATs are usually bilateral treaties and require the signatories to assist
each other in investigations, prosecutions, and other criminal proceedings. Id. The
United States currently has 26 MLATs in force with other countries. Id.; see also
Solomonov, supra note 9, at 198-99 (noting that United States utilizes MLATs with Hun-
gary, Israel, and Italy to prosecute jointly members of transnational organized crime
groups). An MLAT between the United States and the Russian Federation is not cur-
rently in effect. Solomonov, supra, at 211. Russia and the United States do, however,
have a Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement that provides for legal cooperation between
the two countries in criminal matters. Id. This Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement is
narrower in scope than an MLAT and does not provide that Russia must extradite its
citizens who commit crimes in the Untied States. Id. at 211-15. Moreover, scholars
believe that Russian law enforcement officials must battle serious domestic problems
that prevent them from obtaining evidence in organized crime cases. Id. at 211. Rus-
sian law enforcement officials must conquer these problems before a plan of mutual
legal assistance with the United States can be effective. Id.
142. See Department ofJustice, supra note 16 (commenting that because govern-
ment officials from corrupt nations are often taking part in illegal activities themselves,
it is difficult for U.S. law enforcement officials to obtain reliable information from those
governments). But see Hearings 1I, supra note 69 (testimony of James KL Robinson)
(stating that United States signed MLAT with Russia on June 17, 1999, although it has
yet to take force).
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nied access to foreign bank records that are essential in proving
money laundering.
143
b. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act: The
Bank Secrecy Act
The BSA, although originally designed to deter tax eva-
sion,"M has been a primary tool in money laundering investiga-
tions since the 1980s 4. The BSA mandates U.S. financial insti-
tutions to keep records and reports concerning customers' ac-
counts. 146 These paper trails aid law enforcement officials in
investigating possible money laundering and tax evasion
schemes. 147 The BSA imposes civil penalties upon U.S. banks
that do not comply with the BSA.48 These penalties functionally
hold banks liable for facilitating money laundering by failing to
keep proper records.' 49
Under the BSA, U.S. banks are required to keep CTRs and
to report suspicious activity within customer accounts.' 50 U.S.
banks must file CTRs when transactions adding up to US$10,000
or more occur for one account during a single day.' 5 ' These
143. SeeFarah, supra note 58, atAl (stating that offshore banking institutions often
do not cooperate with U.S. banks).
144. See Mulligan, supra note 33, at 2335 (explaining that BSA was enacted primar-
ily to regulate foreign transactions made by U.S. citizens in effort to curtail their usage
of offshore banking havens as illegal tax shelters).
145. Id.
146. Id
147. Id
148. See H.L REP. No. 101-446, at 29-35 (1990) (explaining that BSA mandates
fines and other civil penalties for U.S. banks that do not properly file CTRs).
149. See Mulligan, supra note 33, at 2335 (claiming that Congress chose to burden
banks unduly with BSA requirements).
150. See id. at 2340 (arguing that these reports are burdensome for banks).
151. See 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1994); 31 C.FR. § 103.22 (a)(1) (1998) (mandating
CTR requirement). 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (a) (1) states:
Each financial institution other than a casino or the Postal Service shall file a
report of each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency or other payment or
transfer, by, through, or to such financial institution which involves a transac-
tion in currency of more than $10,000. Transactions in currency by exempt
persons with banks are not subject to this requirement to the extent provided
in paragraph (h) of this section. Multiple currency transactions shall be
treated as a single transaction if the financial institution has knowledge that
they are by or on behalf of any person and result in either cash in or cash out
totaling more than $10,000 during any one business day. Deposits made at
night or over a weekend or holiday shall be treated as if received on the next
business day following the deposit.
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reports must disclose the identity of the customer keeping the
account and the customer's source of funds, as well as other ac-
count information. 15 2 Banks are also obligated to report suspi-
cious or abnormal' 53 account activity, in order to flag possible
money laundering offenses. 5 4  Furthermore, Section 5318
(g) (2) of Title 31 prohibits U.S. banks from notifying any person
involved in the suspicious transaction that the transaction has
been reported. 155 This prohibition of notification allows law en-
forcement officials to investigate alleged laundering activities
without the suspect having knowledge of the potential investiga-
tion.
5 6
Many KYC principles are codified in the BSA. 5 7 Aside from
the CTR requirement, U.S. banks must also use due diligence in
maintaining records of other types of customer information.- 8
Often, this required information includes the kinds of relation-
ships the customer keeps in the course of his or her business, the
type of business the customer operates, and the duration of time
for which the business has been maintained.'59 U.S. banks, how-
ever, have complained that these KYC principles impose heavy
burdens.' 60
152. See Alford, supra note 1, at 461 (noting that such reports of suspicious activity
lay heavy financial burdens upon U.S. banks). In 1989, U.S. banks spent approximately
US$129 million to comply with these reporting requirements. Id.
153. SeeJohn E. Shockey, Bank Regulatory and Enforcement After Barings and Daiwa,
935 PRAc. L. INsT.: CORP. L. & PaAc. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIEs, 681, 717 (1986) (not-
ing that KYC policies dictate that banks should be alert to irregular transactions and
report transactions that appear criminal in nature to authorities).
154. See id. (noting that by reporting suspicious activities, banks can protect them-
selves from allowing criminal transactions to take place through their institutions).
155. 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (g) (2) (1994). Section 5318(g) (2), entitled Notification
Prohibited, states that:
A financial institution, and a director, officer, employee, or agent of any finan-
cial institution, who voluntarily reports a suspicious transaction, or that reports
a suspicious transaction pursuant to this section or any other authority, may
not notify any person involved in the transaction that the transaction has been
reported.
Id.
156. Id.
157. See Mulligan, supra note 33, at 2326 (noting that KYC principles are imbedded
within U.S. money laundering statutory regime).
158. See Guidelines for Monitoring Bank Secrecy Act Compliance, available in 1996 WL
271924, at *9 (F.D.I.C.) (Financial Institution Letter) (noting that banks must take rea-
sonable care to ascertain information about customers).
159. Id
160. SeeJohnJ. Byrne, The Bank Secrecy Act: Do Reporting Requirements Really Assist the
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Another often cited criticism of the BSA is that it potentially
violates the customer's right to privacy.' 61 When the BSA was
proposed, financial institutions tangentially were concerned
about potential civil suits brought by customers for invading fi-
nancial privacy.112 Thus, the BSA includes a "Liability for Disclo-
sures" section designed to prevent customers from suing U.S.
banks for complying with the BSA. 63
c. The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986
Although technically part of the BSA, Section 5324 of Title
31 of the U.S. Code was enacted as the Money Laundering Con-
trol Act of 1986 ("MLCA").164 The MLCA imposes either crimi-
nal fines or prison sentences upon those who structure, or at-
tempt to structure, transactions in a manner designed to avoid
the filing of a CTR.165 Structured transactions during the course
of money laundering, or smurfing, include multiple transactions
made by or on behalf of an individual that total at least
US$10,000 over the course of one day. 166
2. The Proposed Money Laundering Act of 1998
An anti-money-laundering bill, similar to the FMLDA, was
first promogulated in 1998 as part of President Bill Clinton's In-
Government, 44 ALA. L. REV. 801, 802 (1993) (stating that BSA requirements place huge
financial burdens upon banks).
161. See Mulligan, supra note 33, at 2337-38 (stating that during debate over ratify-
ing BSA, many members of U.S. Congress were concerned that BSA would violate finan-
cial privacy of customers).
162. Id
163. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (3) (1994). Section 5318(g) (3), entitled Liability for
Disclosures, states:
Any financial institution that makes a disclosure of any possible violation of
law or regulation or a disclosure pursuant to this subsection or any other au-
thority, and any director, officer, employee, or agent of such institution, shall
not be liable to any person under any law or regulation of the United States or
political subdivision thereof, for such disclosure or for any failure to notify the
person involved in the transaction or any other person of such disclosure.
Id.
164. See Mulligan, supra note 33, at 2341 (explaining that Money Laundering Con-
trol Act of 1986 imposes criminal liability upon those who structure transactions).
165. Id.
166. Id.; see also Mathew P. Harrington & Eric A. Lustig, Article: IRS Form 8300: The
Attorney-Client Privilege and Tax Policy Become Casualties in the War Against Money Launder-
ing, 24 HorSTRA L. REv. 623, 629 (1996) (defining smurfing as practice of "having one
or more couriers make deposits to numerous banks of less than $10,000 each.").
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ternational Crime Control Strategy.'67 Characterizing interna-
tional crime as a threat to U.S. security,' 6 President Clinton is-
sued Presidential Decision Directive 42 on October 21, 1995.169
This directive ordered U.S. Government agencies, including the
Departments of Justice, State, and the Treasury, to develop a
concerted plan to fight international crime.' 70 These agencies
then created the International Crime Control Strategy, which
declared countering international financial crime, including
money laundering, as one of its eight main goals.' 7' The result
was the introduction of the Money Laundering Act of 1998,172
which was submitted to Congress by the U.S. Department ofJus-
tice on March 3, 1998.' 7
The Money Laundering Act of 1998 included several goals
similar in nature to those of the FMLDA.' 74 This act extended
existing U.S. money laundering statutes to encompass transac-
tions made in international banks.' 75 It also included provisions
to allow federal prosecutors access to foreign bank records.'76
Furthermore, similar to the FMLDA, the bill augmented the list
of SUAs to include additional foreign crimes, including fraud
and corruption.' 77 Additional foreign SUAs would allow U.S.
167. See Department ofJustice, supra note 16 (explaining history of President Clin-
ton's proposed strategy).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See id. (describing International Crime Control Strategy as "innovative action
plan that will serve as a roadmap for coordinated, effective, long-term attack on interna-
tional crime."). The strategy establishes eight broad goals. Id. One of these goals is to
combat the laundering of money by international criminals through U.S. banks, as well
as to fight other international financial crime. Id.
172. See id. (noting that other efforts, besides Money Laundering Act of 1988, were
put into effect under International Crime Control Strategy). For instance, Geographic
Targeting Orders ("GTOs") were used in 1996 and 1997 in New York City and Puerto
Rico respectively, to fight money laundering. Id. GTOs are orders provided by the
BSA. Id. Under the BSA, the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States can require
financial institutions in a specified geographical area to report all transactions in any
amount designated by the Secretary. Id. This means that the Secretary can require
reporting requirements for transactions that are less than the standard US$10,000
threshold established by the BSA. Id.
173. See Press Release, supra note 121 (noting that legislators designed Money
Laundering Act of 1988 to address international laundering of criminal proceeds).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.; see FMLDA, H.R. 2896, 106th Cong., § 6 (implying corruption by listing
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prosecutors to bring money laundering charges against
criminals who commit crimes in other countries and launder the
proceeds through U.S. financial institutions.17 8  The Money
Laundering Act of 1998, however, was never ratified. 179 The Act
is still in committee.18
0
One reason that Congress has not yet passed the Money
Laundering Act of 1998 is that, unlike the FMLDA, the Money
Laundering Act of 1998 includes a civil forfeiture provision.' 8
This forfeiture provision allows U.S. prosecutors to seize tempo-
rarily the U.S.-based assets of international criminals arrested
overseas for money laundering or other SUAs.'8 2 The provision
would also allow U.S. prosecutors to restrain the domestic assets
of a foreign bank that is engaged in money laundering in viola-
tion of U.S. law.18 3 The House judiciary Committee never voted
on the Money Laundering Act of 1998 because it opposed the
civil forfeiture provision.'8 4
Chairman Henry Hyde of the House Judiciary Committee,
as well as many others who oppose federal civil forfeiture laws,
said that he did not wish to augment an already abusive civil for-
feiture problem by extending federal laws.' 5 Critics of the fed-
eral civil forfeiture statutes claim that these laws violate the Con-
stitution by taking private property without due process.' 6
Chairman Hyde also recommended that the Senate Judiciary
Committee vote against the Money Laundering Act of 1998.187
"bribery of a public official, or the misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement of public
funds by or for the benefit of a public official").
178. See Press Release, supra note 121 (advocating for adoption of additional anti-
money laundering legislation).
179. See Bill Tracking, H.R. 3745, 105th Cong. (1998) (last visited Nov. 19, 1999)
(showing that Money Laundering Act of 1998 has been stuck in committee).
180. Id.
181. See Money Laundering Act of 1998, H.R. 3745, 105th Cong. § 3 (a) (amending
Section 981 (A) (1) (A) of U.S. Code).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. SeeJulie Fields, Gridlock Scuttles Anti-LaunderingBill; Forfeiture Reform Has Higher
Priority, REcoRD (Bergen County, NJ.), Oct. 10, 1998, atA02 (commenting on ongoing
debate over constitutionality of federal civil forfeiture laws).
185. 1&
186. Id.
187. Id.
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II. THE PROPOSED FOREIGN MONEY LAUNDERING
DETERRENCE AND ANTICORRUPTION ACT OF 1999
Legislators introduced the FMLDA to the U.S. House of
Representatives on September 21, 1999.188 Designed as a tool to
combat money laundering,19 the FMLDA broadens the scope of
existing U.S. anti-money laundering legislation to facilitate U.S.
prosecution of international money launderers. 90 Through the
FMLDA's provisions, legislators intend to make it easier for U.S.
prosecutors to bring U.S. money laundering charges against in-
ternational organized crime groups and government officials
who embezzle money from their countries.' 91
A. Legislative History
The legislators' stated goal in drafting the FMLDA was to
fight money laundering.'9 2 The bill was designed specifically to
combat money laundering by international organized crime
groups and corrupt government officials, as evidenced by con-
gressional findings of fact.' 93 The FMIDLA has since been re-
ferred to the Committee on Banking and Financial Services and
the Committee on the Judiciary1 94 These committees will con-
sider the legality of each provision of the FMDLA that falls
188. See FMLDA, H.R. 2896, 106th Cong., at Title page (stating that bill was spon-
sored by James Leach, Republican from Iowa). Cosponsors include the following.
Spencer T. Bachus III (Republican-Alabama), Richard Hugh Baker (Republican-Louisi-
ana), Douglas K Bereuter (Republican-Nevada), Michael N. Castle (Republican-Dela-
ware), Michael Forbes (Democrat-New York), Peter T. King (Republican-New York),
John J. Lafalce (Democrat-New York), Rich Lazio (Republican-New York), Bill McCol-
lum (Republican-Florida), Dennis Moore (Democrat-Kansas), Marge Roukema (Repub-
lican-New Jersey), and Maxine Waters (Democrat-California). Id.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., FMLDA H.R. 2896, 106th Cong., § 6 (adding international crimes to
list of SUAs in Section 1956(c) (7) of Title 18 of U.S. Code).
191. Id. § 2 (outlining need for more effective money laundering prosecutorial
tools).
192. Id. at Title page (stating that FMLDA is designed "to combat money launder-
ing and protect the United States financial system, and for other purposes.").
193. See id. § 2 (listing seven broad factual findings concerning effects of money
laundering by international organized crime groups and global effects of government
corruption). For example, "[m]oney laundering by international criminal enterprises
challenges the legitimate authority of national governments, corrupts officials and pro-
fessionals, endangers the financial and economic stability of nations, diminishes the
efficiency of global interest rate markets, and routinely violates legal norms, property
rights, and human rights." Id.
194. See id. at Title page (stating that Speaker of House of Representatives shall
determine length of time that FMLDA shall stay in committee).
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within their requisite competencies. 195
B. Provisions of the FMLDA
The FMLDA both amends existing provisions of U.S. anti-
money laundering legislation and adds new ones. 196 These pro-
visions will expand the number of international SUAs that prose-
cutors can use to bring money laundering charges,197 enable
U.S. law enforcement officials to obtain information about
money laundering suspects who are customers of international
banks, 98 and prevent suspects from being notified that they are
being investigated. 199 Additionally, the FMLDA is designed to
deter government officials from embezzling money from their
countries and encourage those officials to fight domestic corrup-
tion.2
00
1. Amendments to Prior Legislation
The proposed FMDLA will amend portions of existing U.S.
and-money laundering legislation in three ways.20 ' First, the
FMLDA will amend Section 1956(c) (7) of Title 18 of the U.S.
Code to include additional permissible foreign SUAs.2 °2 Sec-
ond, the FMLDA will revise the Civil Liability for Disclosures sec-
don of the BSA. 213 Finally, the FMLDA will modify Section
195. Id.
196. Id. §§ 3-7.
197. See id. § 6(1) (A) (adding "any conduct constituting a crime of violence" to list
of SUAs).
198. See id. § 3(a) (adding Section 5331, entitled "Requirements Relating to Trans-
actions and Accounts with or on Behalf of Foreign Entities" to Subchapter II of Chapter
53 of Title 31 of U.S. Code).
199. See id. § 5(b) (prohibiting government actors from notifying individuals that
they are under investigation for money laundering).
200. See id. § 4 (emphasizing necessity that United States address money launder-
ing and corruption problems with other countries).
201. See id. §§ 5-6 (amending portions of existing acts).
202. See id. § 6 (adding, for example, "any conduct constituting a crime of vio-
lence").
203. Id. § 5(a). Section 5(a) states in part:
(a) Amendment Relating to Civil Liability Immunity for Disclosures. Section
5318(g) (3) of title 31, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
(3) Liability for disclosures.
(A) In general. Notwithstanding any other provision of law-
(i) any financial institution that-
(I) makes a disclosure of any possible violation of law or regu-
lation to an appropriate government agency; or
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5318(g)(2) of the BSA, which prohibits notification disclo-
sures.
204
a. Amendment to 18 U.S.C. 1956
The FMLDA will amend Section 1956(c) (7) of Title 18 of
the U.S. Code to include additional permissible foreign SUAs.2 °5
The list includes fraud against a foreign government, bribery of
a public official, embezzlement of public funds, crimes of vio-
lence, the misuse of IMF funds, smuggling, computer fraud, and
several others.2 °6 Furthermore, the list encompasses acts that
are illegal in foreign countries and that would require extradi-
tion if the perpetrator were found in the United States under a
multilateral treaty.20 7 The FMLDA also adds to the list any fed-
(II) makes a disclosure pursuant to this subsection or any other
authority,
(ii) any director, officer, employee, or agent of such institution who
makes, or requires another to make any such disclosure; and
(iii) any independent public accountant who audits any such finan-
cial institution and makes a disclosure described in clause (i),
shall not be liable to any person under any law or regulation of
the United States, any constitution, law, or regulation of any
State or political subdivision thereof, or under any contract or
other legally enforceable agreement (including any arbitration
agreement), for such disclosure or for any failure to notify the
person who is the subject of such disclosure or any other person
identified in the disclosure.
Id.
204. Id. § 5(b). Section 5(b) states:
(b) Prohibition on Notification of Disclosures. Section 5318(g) (2) of title 31,
United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
(2) Notification prohibited.
(A) In general. If a financial institution, any director, officer, em-
ployee, or agent of (i) the financial institution, director, officer,
employee, agent, or accountant may not notify any person in-
volved in the transaction that the transaction has been reported
and may not disclose any information included in the report to
any such person; and
(ii) any other person, including any officer or employee of any
government, who has any knowledge that such report was
made may not disclose to any person involved in the transac-
tion that the transaction has been reported or any informa-
tion included in the report.
Id.
205. See id. § 6 (adding, for example, fraud against foreign government).
206. Id.
207. See id. (naming as included in list of SUAs "an offense with respect to which
the United States would be obligated by a multilateral treaty either to extradite the
ATTACKING THE TOOLS OF CORRUPTION
eral offense consisting of the failure to report the ownership or
control of a foreign corporation, financial account, or beneficial
interest in a foreign trust.2 08 Legislators intended the augmenta-
tion of the list of permissible SUAs to allow federal law enforce-
ment officials to prosecute many more international criminals
than possible under the existing money laundering statutes. °9
b. Amendments to the Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act
The FMLDA will amend the Civil Liability for Disclosures
section of the BSA.21° Immunity from civil suits, including suits
for invasion of privacy, will extend to foreign banks conducting
business in the United States.211  Congress intends that the im-
munity provision encourage foreign banks to assist law enforce-
ment officials and government agencies by disclosing customer
and account information concerning possible violations of laws
or regulations. 2
Additionally, Section 5318(g) (2) of the BSA, which prohib-
its notification disclosures, will be amended to forbid any person
from notifying those involved in the transaction that the transac-
tion is being reported.1 Thus, when a CTR is filed, no one is
permitted to notify the account holder.2 4 Law enforcement of-
ficials often track suspicious accounts in order to gather evi-
dence of money laundering or other financial crimes.215 Notifi-
cation of a CTR may tip the alleged criminal and harm the inves-
tigation.2 16 Legislators designed this additional prohibition to
alleged offender or to submit the case for prosecution, if the offender were found
within the territory of the United States.").
208. Md § 6(4).
209. See Fields, supra note 184, at A2 (commenting generally that federal prosecu-
tors need broader range of SUAs in order to apprehend international money launder-
ers).
210. See FMLDA, H.R. 2896, 106th Cong., § 5(a) (relieving, for example, public
accountants from liability for disclosing possible violations of law to appropriate govern-
ment agency).
211. Id, §5 (a)(i)(1).
212. Id
213. See id. § 5 (b) (2) (A) (ii) (stating that amendment will prohibit "any other per-
son," including "or any officer employee of any government' from notifying any person in-
volved in transaction that transaction is being reported) (emphasis added).
214. Id.
215. See Shockey, supra note 153, at 717-19 (noting that Federal Reserve often is-
sues bulletins alerting banks to current schemes).
216. Id.
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dissuade non-U.S. citizens from interfering in money laundering
investigations. 7
2. New Provisions
The proposed FMLDA will add a new section to Subchapter
II of Chapter 53 of Title 31 of the U.S. Code entitled Require-
ments Relating to Transactions and Accounts with or on Behalf
of Foreign Entities.218 Section 3(a) of the FMLDA will prohibit
unidentified foreign owners from opening or maintaining ac-
counts.2 1 9 This provision effectively extends KYC rules to foreign
entities.220  If an unidentified foreign account already exists,
then the identity of the owner must be obtained no later than six
months after the enactment of the FMLDA. 221
Section 3 (d) (B) (2) of the FMLDA will prohibit the open-
ing or maintaining of correspondent accounts222 or correspon-
dent bank223 relationships with foreign banks in certain jurisdic-
tions.224 These correspondent accounts will include those of vir-
tually unregulated 225 institutions that are maintained in foreign
jurisdictions and who choose not, or are not permitted, to offer
217. See FMLDA, H.R. 2896, 106th Cong., § 5 (b) (2) (A) (ii) (changing existing leg-
islation to prohibit any citizen of any country from notifying account holder that their
transaction has been reported).
218. See id. § 3(a) (adding Section 5331 to BSA).
219. See id. (mandating that financial institution must identify direct and beneficial
owners of account or require that shares of foreign entity are publicly traded).
220. See id. (requiring banks to keep similar information about customers as de-
manded by KYC principles); see generally Heaings I, supra note 23, at 2 (Statement of
Chairman Grassley of the Senate Finance/International Trade Committee) (noting
need for tougher economic policies to counter international money laundering).
Chairman Grassley submitted that Congress should ensure that "[b] anking without bor-
ders does not become an opportunity for banking without conscience." Hearings 1,
supra
221. See FMLDA, H.R. 2896, 106th Cong., § 3 (c) (setting time frame enactment of
new provisions).
222. See id. § 3(d) (B) (2) (noting that correspondent accounts are "established to
receive deposits from and make payments on behalf of a correspondent bank.").
223. See id. § 3(d) (B) (3) (noting that correspondent banks are depository institu-
tions that accept "deposits from another financial institution" and provide "services on
behalf of such other financial institution").
224. See id. § 3 (b) (1) (A)-(B) (prohibiting U.S. banks from opening or maintaining
correspondent accounts with "certain foreign banks").
225. See id. (explaining that these institutions include those that are "not subject to
comprehensive supervision or regulation on a consolidated basis by the appropriate
authorities in such jurisdiction.").
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banking services to the residents in their jurisdiction.226 This
provision effectively will prohibit U.S. banks from dealing with
offshore financial centers, because these centers often do not
offer services to the residents within their jurisdiction and are
almost never regulated.
22 7
Finally, Section 3 of the FMLDA will prohibit U.S. financial
institutions from opening or maintaining PTAs for international
banks,228 unless the international institution identifies each cus-
tomer who accesses the account under similar KYC standards
that are used for U.S. customers of U.S. banks.229 Legislators
designed this section to thwart criminal efforts to circumvent the
KYC regulations that are embodied within the BSA. 23 ° Regulat-
ing PTAs in this manner will make it more difficult to launder
money through U.S. institutions via PTAs.23'
Section 4 of the FMLDA is designed to prevent interna-
tional financial institutions, 232 such as the IMF, from lending
money to governments with high levels of corruption.3 3 Under
this section, if the Secretary of the Treasury finds that a country
has high levels of corruption and does not take measures to com-
226. Id.
227. See Farah, supra note 58, at A01 (stating that many Caribbean offshore bank-
ing havens are almost never regulated in compliance with internationally acceptable
standards).
228. See FMLDA, H.R. 2896, 106th Cong., § 3(c) (mandating U.S. depository insti-
tutions to employ same standards for international customers as for domestic custom-
ers). Section 3(c) states:
A depository institution may not open or maintain a payable-through account
in the United States for a foreign banking institution, unless the depository
institution is able-
(1) to identify each customer of the foreign banking institution who is permit-
ted to use the account; and
(2) with respect to each such customer, to obtain the same information about
the customer that it obtains, in the ordinary course, with respect to a cus-
tomer residing in the United States who opens or maintains an account
through which they are authorized to conduct the same transactions as
may be conducted through the payable-through account.
I&
229. Id.
230. See Hearings I, supra note 7 (testimony of Prof. Keith Henderson) (explaining
that Congress should recognize that KYC principles are imperative tools to combat
money laundering).
231. Id,
232. SeeFMLDA, H.R. 2896, 106th Cong., § 4(b) (designating "international finan-
cial institutions" as defined in Section 1701(c) of International Financial Institutions
Act).
233. Id.
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bat it or to implement good governance, then the Secretary
should order the U.S. executive directors of each international
financial institution to vote against any loan, disbursement, or
other utilization of institutional resources to the country in ques-
tion.214 The only exception is the donation of resources specifi-
cally targeted to meet basic human needs.235 Withholding funds
from corrupt countries will help ensure that criminals are not
embezzling and laundering money from international financial
institutions. 216 Legislators also drafted Section 4 of the FMLDA
as a means of encouraging nations that rely on loans and dona-
tions to take measures to prevent local corruption.3 7
Additionally, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury will be re-
quired to submit annual reports to the U.S. Congress concern-
ing U.S. discussions about corruption and money laundering
with other nations.2 "8 The reports shall include a description of
the extent of corruption in each country mentioned in the re-
port.239 The reports will also describe the efforts undertaken by
nations to prevent money laundering and corruption. 240 The
234. Id. § 4(b). Section 4(b), entitled United States Votes in International Finan-
cial Institutions, states that:
The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Direc-
tors of each international financial institution (as defined in section 1701(c)
of the International Financial Institutions Act) to oppose any loan, disburse-
ment, or other utilization of resources by the international financial institu-
tion, other than to address basic human needs, for any country that the Secre-
tary of Treasury determines-
(1) has a high level of corruption;
(2) is not effectively implementing good governance and anticorruption
measures; and
(3) is not taking meaningful steps to improve good governance and re-
duce corruption.
Id.
235. Id.
236. See id. (implying that countries that do not attempt to combat local corrup-
tion will be harmed economically by having loans from international financial institu-
tions withheld).
237. Id.
238. See id. § 4(c) (1) (explaining that this section of FMLDA calls for United States
to encourage other countries to enact laws prohibiting money laundering and system-
atic corruption). During deliberations with foreign countries, the United States should
also address the specific problem of governmental and elite corruption. Id.
239. See id. § 4(c) (2) (A) (requiring "an assessment by the Secretary of the extent
of corruption in each country covered by the report").
240. See id. § 4(c) (2) (B) (demanding "an assessment by the Secretary of the extent
to which such country maintains effective money laundering and corruption prevention
measures or is implementing such measures.").
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U.S. Congress will use these reports to help determine whether
the United States should support the disbursement of loans
from international financial institutions.24'
III. THE FMLDA IS APPROPRJATE AND NECESSARY TO AID
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICTALS IN COMBATTING THE
LAUNDERING OF PROCEEDS FROM TNTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZED CR!ME AND CORRUPTION
The U.S. Congress should approve the FMLDA. The dra-
matic increase in the laundering of profits from international
organized crime and corruption because of the globalization of
the financial services industry42 demands legislative attention.
U.S. prosecutors have been attempting to combat this problem
without the necessary legal tools to aid their efforts.243 The ex-
isting legislation is not designed to allow U.S. officials to detect
and prosecute money laundering activities of international
criminals. 24 The current statutory regime cannot reprimand
foreign government officials who embezzle money from their
countries and launder it through U.S. financial institutions.245
International money laundering is becoming a costly and dam-
aging domestic and international problem. 46 It harms people
in the United States and abroad, the global economy, and the
governments of other countries.247 The United States should no
longer comply with organized crime and government corruption
241. See i § 4(b) (stating that U.S. Secretary of the Treasury must determine
which countries have high levels of corruption).
242. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text (noting rise of organized criminal
groups laundering money using advanced technology in financial services industry); see
also supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (stating that organized crime syndicates
have used globalization to expand their criminal enterprises).
243. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (explaining that current U.S. anti-
money laundering framework is effective tool for domestic money launderers, but inef-
fective for international money launderers); see also supra notes 45-65 and accompany-
ing text (explaining methods used by international money launderers to circumvent
BSA); see also supra notes 130-43 and accompanying text (detailing problems with Sec-
tion 1956 of Title 18 of U.S. Code).
244. See supra notes 20, 45-65, 130-43, and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (explaining that corrupt govern-
ment officials, such as Omar Bongo, cannot be prosecuted in United States for embez-
zling money).
246. See supra notes 69-95 and accompanying text (detailing effects of organized
crime and government corruption).
247. Id.
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by allowing money to be laundered through its banks and other
financial institutions.
A. U.S. Money Laundering Legislation Should Comprehend the Entire
Scope of Foreign SUAs Typically Employed by Organized Crime Groups
U.S. federal prosecutors should not be precluded from
bringing money laundering charges against foreign criminals
who commit an underlying crime that is not listed in the money
laundering statutes.2 48 Legislators should extend the list of per-
missible SUAs to include crimes, such as fraud and embezzle-
ment, which typically occur in countries with high levels of cor-
ruption.2 49 Adoption of the FMLDA would enhance the list of
permissible SUAs and thus broaden the scope of international
criminals who could be prosecuted in the United States for
money laundering.250 U.S. prosecutors could use the extended
list of SUAs as a tool to prosecute members of international or-
ganized crime syndicates who rely on money laundering to legiti-
mize their illicit profits.251
For example, in the Bank of New York case, the original
indictment against Edwards and Berlin fell short of federal
money laundering charges.252 Since U.S. prosecutors could not
show that the money the couple transmitted derived from one of
the SUAs listed in Section 1986 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, the
prosecutors had to charge them with the lesser offense of trans-
mitting money without a license.25 3 Prosecutors had established,
however, that the money was laundered in a manner designed to
evade Russian tax law.254 Under the FMDLA, if the crime of tax
evasion had allowed Russia to extradite the couple and thus
qualified as an SUA,255 then U.S. prosecutors could have imme-
248. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text (explaining elements that pros-
ecutors must prove in order to bring money laundering charges).
249. See supra notes 130-43 and accompanying text (noting that many crimes typi-
cally committed by international money launderers, such as embezzlement, are not
listed as SUAs).
250. See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text (describing FMLDA amend-
ment to Section 1956 of Title 18 of U.S. Code).
251. Ici
252. See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text (summarizing Bank of New
York case).
253. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (detailing indictments of Lucy Ed-
wards and Peter Berlin in Bank of New York scandal).
254. See id. (explaining motive for Bank of New York money laundering).
255. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (claiming that FMLDA would allow
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diately charged them with money laundering.
B. International Bank Customers Should Be Scrutinized Under the
Same KYC Standards as US. Customers
U.S. banks should not be able to profit from international
customers-who may be laundering money through U.S. ac-
counts-by not applying the same due diligence standards as
employed in acquiring information about U.S. customers. Banks
and other financial institutions in the United States should not
be allowed to hide behind the excuse of protecting international
customers's financial privacy,256 when the same protections have
been curtailed for U.S. customers by BSA requirements.2 57 In-
ternational customers of U.S. banks should be subjected to the
same level of scrutiny under KYC standards as U.S. customers.
258
Furthermore, U.S. banks engaged in international banking
should be obliged to operate their facilities to minimize the pos-
sibility of money laundering by international criminalsY59 Adop-
tion of the FMLDA will make the BSA standards applicable to
international customers of U.S. banks.2 60 The imposition of
such standards will aid law enforcement officials greatly in their
ability to detect transnational money laundering.
C. The United States Should Encourage Other Countries To Create
and Implement Money Laundering and Anticorruption Legislation
International organized crime and government corruption
is a global problem that necessitates a concerted action by all
countries. 261 Adoption of the FMLDA will mandate that efforts
are taken to encourage other countries to adopt money launder-
U.S. prosecutors to charge international criminals who launder profits of crimes for
which they would be extradited with money laundering).
256. See supra note 161-62 and accompanying text (noting U.S. banks' concern
about being held liable for invading customer's privacy).
257. See supra notes 156-63 and accompanying text (detailing G-R requirements
and KYC principles applied to U.S. customers through BSA).
258. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (noting that PTA customers are
not currently subject to U.S. KYC principles).
259. See supra note 220 and accompanying text (arguing that even banks that prac-
tice internationally should engage in conscientious banking practices).
260. See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text (asserting ways in which
FMLDA will mandate that banks use KYG standards for international customers).
261. See supra notes 69-95 and accompanying text (noting extent of global
problems caused by organized crime and government corruption).
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ing and anticorruption legislation.262 Furthermore, the FMLDA
places a duty upon the U.S. Secretary of Treasury to monitor
corrupt countries in order to ensure that the adopted legislation
is enforced.263
Additionally, the FMDLA will reinforce U.S. foreign policy
by obligating U.S. representatives of international financial insti-
tutions to vote against loans for corrupt foreign governments. 264
U.S. taxpayers should not be obligated to contribute money to
international financial institutions if that money is going to be
embezzled by foreign government officials. 265 Because organiza-
tions like the IMF have virtually no way of monitoring how their
money is utilized, the U.S. money laundering statutory regime
should preempt corrupt government officials from embezzling
IMF funds.266 The FMLDA will mandate such preventative meas-
ures.
2 67
CONCLUSION
It is imperative that the U.S. Congress adopt the FMLDA.
The U.S. money laundering statutory framework is currently un-
able to comprehend changes in money laundering techniques
due to the globalization of organized crime and corruption. In
order to protect the safety of U.S. citizens, the integrity of for-
eign governments, and the international market, the United
States must take measures to fight this expanding problem.
Adoption of the FMLDA will provide federal law enforcement
officials and prosecutors with the proper weapons to combat in-
ternational money laundering.
262. See supra notes 232-41 and accompanying text (explaining that Section 4 of
FMLDA will force U.S. government to encourage other countries to end domestic cor-
ruption).
263. Id.
264. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text (detailing process through
which FMLDA will prevent U.S. representatives of international financial institutions
from voting to donate money to corrupt countries).
265. See supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text (asserting that corrupt govern-
ment officials often embezzle money from organizations, like IMF, that loan or donate
money to their countries).
266. Id.
267. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text (noting FMLDA's proscribed
procedure for preventing international government corruption).
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